The Kosovo MACC:
11

The Most Successful Mine Action
Program Ever"

Using groundbreaking new ideas and ingenious combinations of favorite
demining methods, the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC)
has succeeded in clearing the province of landmines in less than three years.
Mr. John Flanagan, MACC Program Manager, offers insights on the MACC's
accomplishments and a vision for the future of mine action.

by JJ Scott, MAIC
Introduction
June I 0, 1999: The NATO Secretary General announced the suspension
of NATO air strikes in Kosovo. After
seven days o f rele ntl ess bombing,
Yugoslav and Serbian forces had agreed
ro withdraw from Kosovar territory, clearing the way for deploymem of United
Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the Kosovo
Stabilization Fo rce (KFOR). Simultaneously, the UN declared the establishment of the UN lnrerim Administration
for Kosovo (UNMIK), mandating that
this body "promote an atmosphere of security and safety that will enable all refugees and internally displaced perso ns
(IDPs) ro enjoy the right ro return freely
ro their homes and to live in conditions
in which the highest standards of human
rights and fundamental freedoms are respected."1 The UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) recognized the threat that
landmines and UXO posed to the success of this goal and set about developing
a program to deal with these hazards.
One week later, with KFOR entrenched and the Serbians extracted, the
Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) opened for business with
John Flanagan serving as the MACC's
Program Manager. Under his leadersh ip,
the Kosovo demining program swept the
counrry clean of threatening landmines
and UXO in just over two years, an unprecedented achievement. In December

200 1, Mr. Flanagan declared Kosovo's

UXO threat ro be comparable ro that of
any other European country, thus accomplishing the MACC's primary mission.
Although Kosovo's iniriallandmine
and UXO situation was unique in some
respects, several lessons learned there can
be applied to future mine anion programs (MAPs). Mr. Flanagan believes that
if every MAP used demining methods
appropriate to their unique situations, the
worldwide landmine problem could be
solved in a relatively short rime-much
shorter than most in the dem ining community consider possible. Some of his
insights are introduced below as I outline the Kosovo MACC from top to bottom, hopefully illuminating all of the
imaginative answers this program used to
solve mine action's toughest questions.

The Kosovo MACC
Organization
With only seven days elapsing between conception and implementation of
the program, it is amazing just how many
acronyms stand between the UN and the
Kosovo MACC. The UN established
UNMIK and gave the administration a
mandate that included providing for the
safe return of thousands ofiDPs. Because
landmines and UXO presented such a
hazard ro returning civilians, UNMAS
became involved. Officials at UNMAS
chose the UN Office for Program Services (UNOPS) ro design an UNMIK
Mine Action Program (MAP), which they
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charged with all coordination acnvltles
surrounding the deminingofKosovo. That
MAP became known as the Kosovo MACC.
As a coordinating body, the MACC
had no demining assets of its own, instead relying on other organizations to
carry out all operations. Mr. Flanagan
explained, "One of the key differences in
the establishment of the Kosovo MACC
was the extra 'C' in our title. The MACC
was deliberately set up as a 'coordination'
center, rather than the more traditional
mine action center." Other UN departments, NGOs and corporations provided
all deployable machinery, manpower and
com modities. This setup allowed each
organization ro focus on irs specialty areas while rhe MACC worked o n integratin g all activities. For example, while
MINE-TECH performed deminingoperarions in western Kosovo on land previously surveyed by the HALO Trust, the
Inte rnationa l Co mmittee of th e Red
C ross (ICRC) and Handicap International (HI) simultaneously conducted
mine awareness and victim assistance programs in the same areas. The MACC concentrated solely on directing the work of
all organizations involved ro ensure maximum efficiency.
A new "Senior Partner" system was
also implemented by the MACC ro help
spread authority and coordination responsibilities among the different organizations assisting in each of the many
facets of mine action. Under chis arrangement, some of the major clearance and
awareness organizations acted as coordinarors at the local level, rhus eliminating
unnecessary additional infrastructure and
personnel costs. This scenario also gave
these organizations a sense of pride and
ownership over their parts of the program, theoretically increasing the quality of their work.

Mission Statement
The MACC's stared goals were deceptively simple and srraightforward:
"Replicate the situation that exists in virrually all European countries that have
experienced conA ict during rhe 20'h Century;" and do it within three years. 2 In this
condition, citizens may periodically find
scattered mines and UXO remaining after clearance, bur they have been trained
to safely handle the situation. Ltndmines
and UXO pose only rhe smallest threat
to civi lians as th ey go about rebuilding
their economic and social lives. The goal
in Kosovo was not 100 percent clearance.
The MACC estimated that completely
clearing the entire country would have
taken 30 to 50 years usi ng standard
manual demining methods. Obviously,
that rime frame would not allow Kosovo
to rebuild in a timely manner. So the
MACC adopted a differenr tactic, trading a I 00 percent safety guaranree (after
five decades) for the immediate improvement of most Kosovars' lives and a small

amount of residual risk. The MACC attempted to minimize civilian impact as
quickly and effic iently as possible, thus
helping the most people in the least
amount of rime. Realizing this goal required some innovative methodology by
the MACC, as no previous MAP had ever
laid out such ambitious goals within such
a limi ted rimeframe.

The MACC's Five
Principles
The Kosovo MACC quickly established five principles to form the foundation upon which ro build the rest of
rhe program. Stressing efficiency, speed
and safety, the MACC focused on:
• Integrated Mine Action
• Information Managemenr
• Th rear Assessment
• Risk Management
• Quality Management
Using new srrategies and proven
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techniques, the Kosovo MACC delivered
on irs promises by following these principles faithfully. Examples of the novel
combinations used by the MACC are
outlined below.

Integration
The MACC needed to address each
of the four pillars of mine action-mine
clearance, mine awareness, victim assistance and advocacy-and they needed to
do it quickly and efficiently. They soon
determined that they needed to integrate
mine acrion acnvntes on an unprecedented scale. Effective integration involves the concurrent execution of various aspects of mine action to elimi nate
redundancy and wasted effort. For example, groups might co ndu ct mine
awareness simultaneously with demining
operations in a village, as explained above. • A Bosnian d eminer
gently probes for
Effectively in regrating all four pillars allandmines during
lowed rhe MACC to accomplish their
an exercise with live
ordinance. c/o AP
lofty goals with unsurpassed efficiency.

• A"booby trap"
mine. c/o UN/
UNHCR

Information Management
Integrat ion on rhe sca le rhar the
Kosovo MACC dealt with required a new
system for informacion management. To
coordinate the survey reams and m ine
awareness groups with the multiple
NGOs carryi ng our the actual demining,
the MACC had to process vast amounts
of raw data and then distribute usefu l
informacion to people in the field in a
timely manner. This would be a daunting task anywhere, bur in rhe deci mated
counrry of Kosovo, ir cou ld have been a
nightmare. Luckily, the Geneva I nrernational Ce nte r for Human i tarian
Demining (G IC HD) stepped in with
their newly developed Informa tion Managemem Sysrem for Mine Action (JMSMA).
IMSMA provides the emire mine
action commun ity with a standardized reposirory for data. Everyone participating
in a mine action project- survey rakers,
dem in ers, and those involved with mine
awareness and victim assistance-gath ers rhe same statistics from every area
withi n rhe work zo ne and subm its them
ro rhe IMSMA database. Using this standardized data, IMSMA all ows coordi natOrs to dramatically inc rease their efficiency. Ma nagers can analyze da ta, view
graphs and charts of all data, plot geographic maps of mine fields, keep track
of all mine action activities, a nd view
compilations of any statistics they wish,
all within rhe same system. "It enabled
us ro co ll ate and analyze a m ass ive
amount of data in a very short period of
rime and allowed the ha nds-on manage-

menr of clearance and m ine awareness
activities," Mr. Flanagan explained.
In Kosovo, the MACC had ro take
care not to repeat activities already completed by KFOR during their own milita ry demin ing activities. KFOR conducted su rveys ro locate mined areas and
to determine the accuracy of other reports; both are activities that rhe MACC
itself might otherwise have needed co do.
Fortuna tely, KFOR agreed to use the
IMSMA database, rhus allowing all of
their mine action-related data co be compiled along with rhe MACCs. To ensure
rapid distribution of th is processed info rmatio n within Kosovo, rhe MACC established regularly up dated satellite offices throughout the cou n try. Some
NGOs also ser up information centers for
local populations, allowing civilians to
access landmine and UXO data about
their own community without traveling
long disrances.3
Though invaluable, the IMSMA system was nor flawless. Working with rhe
GICHD, the MACC Info rmacion Technology Branch assisted in the development of a new version of the system. According to Mr. Flanagan, "version 2.2 is
s ign ifican tly better chan the version 1. 1
m odel initiall y deployed in Kosovo. "
Most UN demin ing programs now use
chis vastly improved version ofiMSMA.

Threat Assessment
When civil ians see a truck burdened
with crates ofl andmines barrel past rhem,
and ch en observe overturned dirt or
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empty crates in a nearby meadow, that
meadow becomes a m ine field. When
something-anything-goes bang!, rh e
e ntire surrounding area becomes a mine
field. Landmines frighten people, so
when a rumor gets starred about mines,
people rend ro exaggerate the size of the
affected area when reporting it ro authorities or eve n create imaginary mine fields
where none exist. D id rhar truck simply
deliver those crates of mines to so m e
warehouse without ever planting the m?
Was that only a random p iece of UXO
rhar exploded in the field, dangerous bur
not requiring the comm irmenr of a fullscale demining contingent? Previously, it
didn't matter in humanitarian demining,
because every reported mine field got t he
same assets thrown at ir, leaving deminers
to discover that sometimes the mines
they'd been hunting never actually existed. Ghost mine fields drained resources
just as fast as rhe real thing.
At first, ghost mine fields posed a
real problem to the MACC's goals. The
Kosovo MACC needed a way to qu ickly
confirm o r discredit reponed mine fields
to hel p them disuibure assets in rhe mosr
efficienr manner possible. Instead of a
cookie-curter me ntality (usi ng rhe same
solution for every problem), rhey customized their approach depending o n the
si tuation. Surveys have always been a necessary component of any demin ing program, and rhe Kosovo program was no
different. Level One surveys helped rhe
MACC to subsranriare or discredit civilian- reported mine fields. The MACC
devised a sysrem that divided Kosovo inro
320 di stinct districts and then assigned
each d istrict a mine impact rari ng ofh igh,
low, or ni l. This level of p recision allowed
rhe MACC ro cusromize their response
to an unprecedented degree.
Befo re committing resources, rhe
MACC followed up with Level Two surveys ro determi ne exactly wh ich land in
a suspected mine field anually contained
mines. Quire often, surveyo rs discovered
char suspect contaminated areas were devoid of m ines. O ther fields were mined
at such a low level rhar the MACC
deemed full-scale deployment of fo rces
unnecessary. Determining the mine density in each field ensured an efficienr distribution of assets.

Risk Management
"Our mantra within rhe MACC was
'We're nor go ing co prod our way across
Kosovo'," annou nced Mr. Flanagan. This
slogan is another example of the MACC's
efforts ro get things done in rhe most efficient way possible, even if they had to
abandon some standard practices. Many
demining practitioners feel that manual
demining is rhe su rest, safest and most
depen dable method of clearing mine
fields. While th is may be rrue, manual
demining is also often the slowest and
least efficient demining method, a fact
recognized by the MACC. In accordance
with rheir stared goal of clearing more
land faster, the MACC emp loyed mine
detecting dogs (M ODs), mechanica l systems and manual tea ms in various combinations, depending on rhe situation.
While realizing that utilizing methods other than manual demining might
have left a slightly greater percentage of
mines/UXO after clearance, rhe MACC
decided that th e speed and efficiency benefits granted by such systems far ourweighed any increase in risk. Adopting
this policy required rhar the MACC break
from some standard operating procedures
(SO Ps) during their demining exercises.
Mr. Flanagan assured me that SOPs were
nor recklessly broken, "bur we did not
slavishly adhere ro procedures if they
could be safely modified to increase efficiency and productivity." He further explained that rhe MACC's Quality Assurance Officer had to approve every deviation from SOPs, "and would nor do so if
there was any question about the safety
or applicabil ity of the action."

Quality Management
Considering the compromises made
for the sake of speed and efficiency, rhe
Kosovo MACC pur special emphasis on
their quality assurance program. The
MACC designed the program ro ensure
that all a reas declared safe were in fac t
cleared to the appropriate standards. Only
through such a program could the
MACC safely maintain irs desired balance between safety and speed.
Five Quality Assurance (QA) reams
rorared th rough each of the clearance areas on a regular schedule, focus ing on

specific, well-defined areas during each
visit. QA teams had rwo goals: make sure
clemining reams operated safely co prevent their own injuries, and make sure
they operated thoroughly to prevent civilian injuries after clearance was concluded. The QA reams achieved both
goals by ensuring that each clearance operation adhered to irs MACC-approved
SOPs. "This is based on the notion rhar
if correct procedures are followed, m ine
clearance is a relatively mechanical, safe
activity" for deminers and civil ians alike,
Mr. Flanagan explained. QA teams acted
as "communi ty constables, nor riot police. Their job was to identify problems

nared all mine action activities, but other
organizations carried our all actual operations. Once again, rhe MACC's management methods sometimes strayed from
the accepted norm, but their imaginative
initiatives proved effective and successful.

Mine Clearance
Clearance operations are rhe heart
of any Mine Action operation. Removing a landmine from the ground is the
only way to guarantee that it never cla ims
a victim. In Kosovo, the MACC had to
contend with mines laid by three different factions: the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), the Serbian Special Po lice (MU P)

Acronyms
UN Interim Administration for Kosovo
UN M ine Action Service
Mine Action Program
Mine Action Coordination Center
Information Management System for Mine Action
Mine Detection Dogs
Cluster Bomb Unit
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Kosovo Stabilization Force; UN Peacekeepers
Kosovo Liberation Army
Serbian Special Police
Vojska Jugoslavic; The Yugoslav Army

UNMIK
UN MAS
MAP
MACC
IMSMA
MDDs
CBU
NATO
KFOR
KLA
MUP
VJ

in rheir infancy, before they caused major catastrophes," he continued . In
demining, catastrophes equal unnecessary, preventable injury and/or death for
workers or civi Iians. Each QA ream
worked to eliminate the possibili ty of any
such occurrence.

Mine Clearance, Mine
Awareness and Victim
Assistance in Kosovo
The MACC's five guiding principles-integrated mine action , information management, threat assessment, risk
management and quality managementappl ied to each of the four pillars of Mine
Action add ressed in Kosovo. While they
did nor emphasize advocacy, rhe MACC
was heavily involved with clearance,
aware n ess and victim assistance in
Kosovo. Remember, rhe MACC coordi-
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and rhe Vojska Jugoslavic (VJ). The VJ
provided rhe MACC with 620 mine field
records of varying accuracy and comprehensiveness. Says Mr. Flanagan, "the
maps provided by the VJ proved invaluable as a guide for determ ining the scope
and nature of each mine clearance task."
When used in conju nction with all other
information sources, rhe maps allowed
the MACC to ger a fairly accurate idea
of where mines might lie in wait. Discernible patterns in VJ mine fields also
greatly assisted demining operations,
since rhe VJ had p lanted the vast majority of the mines found by the MACC.
The MUP specialized in laying small
numbers of unmarked nuisance mines
throughout villages and around essential
i nfrasrrucru re elemen rs. These stray
mines proved particularly troublesome as
their dangerous positioning bur low density made their removal both necessary

and inefficient. Again, ex perienced
deminers could sometimes detect patterns even without any records. This demonstrates the remarkable level of experience and competence displayed by some
of the demining organizati ons. These
guys were good.
The KLA reported clearing a lim ines
th ey had laid during the war, and
deminers in the field generally confirmed
this claim. Only a few mine fie lds discovered in Kosovo could be attributed to
Kl.A activities. Though all data provided
by combatants helped, the maps and in-

• Amine
contaminated
neighborhood.
c/oAP

formation given to the MACC men tioned only 624 of the nearly 2,500 minesuspected areas reported by civilians. This
fact shows the importance of the MACC's
own surveys in determining the severity
of each district's landmin e problem.
Sometimes sold iers have berrer things to
do than mark mine field maps as accurately as possible.
D espite troubles with maps provided
by each fact ion, the demining groups
working under the MACC neutralized
thousands of landmin es in Kosovo. By
November of 200 I, with 93 percent of
deminin g activiti es co mpleted , these
groups had prevented 23,359 landmines
from injuring any living creature. ln the
process, the MACC declared 30.5 mil-

lion square m eters of land free from the
impact of mines, thus allowing inhabitants of these areas to resume normallife.4
Landmines are never the only devices
rhar humanitarian deminers must conrend with, as any piece of UXO can act
as a mine by indiscriminately exploding
when discu rbed. This proved especially
true in Kosovo. NATO forces relied
heavily on cluster bomb uni ts (CBUs)
during their air campaign, and remnants
of these insidious devices-many still potentially explosive-littered large swaths
of the Kosovo landscape after t he war.

CBUs consist of a several-foot-long m etal
housing shaped like a conve ntional
bomb, bur instead of contai nin g a single
warhead, each C BU conceals hu ndreds
of sma ll e r warheads. Each of these
bomblets, as they are called, is capable of
significant destruction.
D eminers hare CBUs for two reasons: First, they are designed to disperse
their devastating parcels over a large area
so rhey can destroy more enemy assets
than is possible with conventional, singlewarhead bombs. Second, and more significant ro deminers, the bomblers released by C BUs don't always explode.
Military sources acknowledge a fai lu re
rare of five to seven percent, meaning rhat
abou t s ix percent of all bomblers reach
•
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armored loaders played a verification role
in areas where locals refused to use large
srrerches of land because they'd "hea rd"
chat a m ine field existed in rhe area. As
mentioned above, these ghost mine fie lds
could have eaten up huge amoums of the
MACC's resources if deminers had to
manually investigate each one. Instead,
the rollers were deployed to quickly verifY
the absence of mines. Mr. Fla nagan commented, "We named this sort of clearance 'peace of mine(d) clearance'," si nee
no mines were actually removed because
they had never existed!
T he MACC had to prove that the
land was mine-free in order to return it
ro productive use. Large machines may
nor be well suited to many dem ining
casks, but their utility in these verification roles clearly showed that machines
can bring va lue to a demi ning operation,
provided they are used only with in their
specifications. Mr. Flanagan summed up
rhe MACC's app roach to mine clearance
in Kosovo by reiterating the MACC's core
commi tments: "We used a combination
of manual, MDD, and mechanical systems and evaluated rhe best approaches
to ensu re that we created an appropriate,
integrated solution for each specific activity."
Looking forward to the evenrua l extract io n o f all MACC-supervised
dem in i ng organ izarions, Hand icap Internario nal ( HI ) began train ing a local
dem ining capacity in August of 200 I.
Known as rhe Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC), these men rook over res idual
demini ng operations once the MACC
had finis hed. W henever a civilian spots a
landm ine or UXO fro m now on, they
must notifY rhe KPC ro take care of ir.
Obviously, the MACC worked very hard
to ensure that these men do not receive
much work.

the grou nd intact, spread over a large area,
still armed and ready to kill . Bad as rh is
sounds, many deminers report char true
failure rates are probably 15-20 perce nt.
One our of every five bomblers landing
intact means huge problems for humanitarian deminers, and Kosovo proved no
different. In addition to their abundance
and pervasiveness throughout Kosovo,
CBU bomblers are also much more fragile than most other explosive devices.
Whereas landmin es must be triggered by
weight or tripwire, a bombler may explode from even the most cautious handling. Often exploding them in place is
rhe only safe way to deal with bomblets.
NATO provided coordinates for 333
rargered areas over which allied planes
dropped 1392 CBUs. Within rarger areas, deminers discovered colossal strips of
land saru ra red wirh shrapnel , shattered
machinery and still-active bomblers. This
metal-strewn environment greatly complicates the use of metal detectors, leading to an increased reliance on dogs and
other methods. Some bomb lets we re
found in racr and still armed mo re than
50cm below the surface, and d em iners
d iscovered one complete CBU over rwo
meters deep!~ By November 2001,
deminers in Kosovo had disposed of over
20,000 bomb lets and or h er UXO.
NATO member nations covered much
of the clearance costs for the CBUs they
dropped through bilateral fundin g.
The demining organizations in
Kosovo used all assets available ro rhem
over rh e duration of the operation.
M anual deminers, MDDs, and machines
all played prominent roles in rhe field.
Manual d emin ers and dogs rook rhe lead
by findi ng most of the mines, whi le mach ines played more of a supporr/QA ro le.
Demining organ izations operating under
rhe MACC u ed four diverse flail systems,
employing each strictly within irs specifi cations. After dem in ers removed all
idencified rows of mines, the flails
pounded th rough and ensured rhar no
mines re mained hidden outside of or between the rows. If a machine did strike a
mine in a previously cleared area, an investigation fo llowed immediately to determine why the mine still lingered and
whar remedial actions needed to be taken.
Huge Pearson rollers moun ted on

Mine Awareness
W hil e deminers surveyed and
cleared rowns and surround ing areas of
landmines and UXO, other organ izations
conducted mine awareness cam paigns,
inform ing civilians of the dangers posed
by the ex plosive devices strewn about
their war-torn comm unities. Many civilians are simply unaware of the dangers
posed by land m ines in their area, so they
act in ways that elevate their risk fo r in-
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jury or death. Mine awareness programs
rell civilians where mines or UXO are
bu ried, what dangers these devices represent and what ro do if they spot an
unmarked landmine, all with rhe in renr
of changing risky behaviors to prevenr
unnecessary casualties.
The MACC designed two mine
awareness programs for Kosovo: the Safer
Village concept and rhe Child-to-Ch ild
program. Each program attacked rhc
m ine awareness problem from a different angle, bur their overriding goal was
rhe same: educate civilians (especially
children) to avoid preventable deaths due
to landmines. The Safer Village concept
looked at each village in isolation and
then developed specific recommendations ro help citizens identifY and eliminate their hazardous behaviors. The
Child-to-Child program rook advantage
of children's p ropensity to share everything they know with their friends. Program organizers taught groups of children
to avoid mine-suspected areas and what
to do if they did come across an unmarked mine. These children rhen passed
on the information at school and at home
while organizers reinforced the lessons
through traditional activities.
As clearance progressed, rhe main
message changed from avoidance of
mined areas to the safe reporting of stray
m ines and UXO. Trainers taught the children to report all suspicious materials ro
rhe police, KFOR or JC RC volunteers.
Both programs proved extremely effective, as casualties dropped nearly every
month for their duration.

Victim Assistance
Neither mine clearance nor m1ne
awareness programs can prevent all mine/
UXO accidenrs. Several agencies specialized in help ing landmine survivors with
their recovery and eventual reintegration
into society. In Kosovo, rhe World H ealrh
Organization (WHO) rook rhe lead, with
assistance from the ICRC, HI and rhe
Mother Theresa Society. Recovery andrehabilitation activities rely heavily on
sound infrastructure, and the run-down
state of many Kosovar buildings certainly
retarded these groups' efforts. The
MACC's primary victim assistance goal
was to rebuild a national capacity to al•
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low Kosovars to care for their fallen comrades with their own means.
A countrywide survey of all known
landmine/UXO survivors in Kosovo also
fell under the auspices of the victim assistance program. This investigation obtained baseline data to paint a fuller picmre of rhe socio-economic and psychosocial needs of affected Kosovars. Ana lysis of the gathered data allowed for more
effective and efficient planning, rhus furthering the MACC's overriding goals of
speed, efficiency, and safery.6

Unusual Circumstances
Throughout the HD commun ity,
there has been an ompouring of praise
for the Kosovo MACC and irs man agement ream. While the MACC was certainly an undeniable success, we must
note some of the unique circumstances
that contri buted significantly to the
MACC's achievements. Perhaps rhe most
visible factor was the veritable avalanche
of aid char initially descended upon the
MACC. The war in Kosovo was extremely high profile and included many
of the world's major players, which led
to high donor interest from the outset.
"Thanks to the efforts of a number of
donors, equipment, personnel and operational clearance capabilities were provided
in a rapid manner," Mr. Flanagan noted . .
But rhe avalanche of aid proved typically
short-lived. As with many demining operations, donations tailed off at the end
of the mission , bu r rhe MACC's ingenuity pulled the program through rhe rough
rimes. Said Mr. Flanagan, "Ar rimes we
were basically cash-strapped ... but at the
end of the year the task was completed."
And that's all that matters.
Kosovo was a disaster area when the
MACC first became operational, lacking
many basic governmental services.
Though this was surely detrimental in
many regards, it also allowed the UN to
act unimpeded by local authorities. Along
with functional roads, health care services
and governmental offices, red rape simply did not exist in Kosovo by the ri me
the MACC arrived. The UN observed the
situation, decided what was necessary and
implemented the program with unmatched efficiency. Likewise, the MACC

did not have to worry about much resistance or interference from local leaders.
Finally, though mines and UXO
saturated Kosovo , the province itself is
relatively small, leaving less area to scour
than in man y other operations. The
landmine problem was also fairly recent
in Kosovo, so no 50-year-old mines were
around to discover in long-forgonen areas. People generally had a good idea of
which areas were mined and wh ich were
clear, and combatants provided maps to
complement people's memories. When all
available information was collected and
ana lyzed using the IMSMA system, the
MACC found it fairl y easy to determine
which areas required clearance and which
resources to use.
That being said, the significance of
the MACC's accomplishments cannot be
overemphasized. Mr. Flanagan himself
declared the MACC to be "the most successful MAP ever implemented by the
UN." A bold statement to be sure, bur
who would argue? As Mr. Flanagan reminded me, "this was the first time that
the UN had actually started and completed a mine action program through its
stated objectives." The MACC ea rned
laudatory comments for its effective management strategies, early adoption and
thorough implementation of the IMSMA
system, and the declaration of unambiguous and attainable goals. Remarking on
the nearly universal praise garnered by the
MACC, he added: "I believe that almost
all those who worked under the UN
umbrella during the program in Kosovo
would agree" that the MACC was an absolute success.

Lessons Learned and the
Future of Mine Action
Though the circumstances surrounding the MACC's implementation
were rather unique, some of the lessons
learned in Kosovo are applicable to fu-

ture MAPs. Mr. Flanagan informed me
that the overall strucwre of the Kosovo
MACC is being imitated in Lebanon and
Eritrea, since "there are certain principles
that should be applied wherever possible."
However, he stressed that the most important lesson from Kosovo "is that there
is no template solution in mine action."
The most effecti ve tactic used by the
MACC was the design and implementation of a" Kosovo solution to the Kosovo
problem." Integration and effective informacion management allowed the complete customization of the MACC-Ied
program, the flexibility of which led in
turn to unmatched speed, efficiency, safety
and success throughout the operation.
Mine action is often presented as an
impossible problem. We've all heard that
there are bi llions of landmines covering
entire continents, completely eliminating
populations, and that their removal may
very well rake till the end of time. Yes,
I'm exaggeratin g, but my hyperbole is
on ly sl ightly inflated when compared to
the numbers frequently reported by advocacy groups, numbers that get frequent
exposure in the press, accuracy be
damned. Mr. Flanagan chooses to look
at the land mine problem from a much
different, much more optimistic and
practical outlook. "! firml y believe that
the problem of mine contamination can
be rapidly brought under control in the
vast majority of affected countries using
existing technologies and techniques if
each program is properly managed and
implemented. An integrated approach is
critical," he declared. Obviously, he bases
this statement on the recent success of
the Kosovo MACC, bur the wisdom to
that approach cannot be denied.
Mr. Flanagan is not an overly optimistic dreamer when it comes to mine
action though, either. He sees a very small
window of opportunity open ro the
demin ingworld righr now, a window that
may slam shut unless the HD commu-
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niry can come up with a suing of successes now. If other projects are not
wrapped up quickly and successfully,
"then there is a strong possibility chat
donors will become disillusioned and interest in the topic will wane," he prophesies.
W ith world acrention currently focused on Afghan istan and the landmine
siwarion there, the stage is set for a flurry
of demining activities throughout the
world. Flush with his recent, hard-earned
success, Mr. Flanagan manages to see a
light at the end of the demining tunnel,
much nearer than many others in the field
wou ld suspect. "If all the resources that
are currently being frittered away through
disjointed, inefficient or otherwise wasteful projects were brought to bear as part
of a coordinated efforr, the problem could
essentially be solved in a ten-year period,"
he claims. Here's hoping that all other
MAPs throughout the world can achieve
the same success that Mr. Flanagan and
the Kosovo MACC have, because only
then will the world enjoy the reality of Mr.
Flanagan's inspiring ten-year vision: a world
free from the impact of landmines.•
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The Mine Action
Program in
Afghanistan
The United Nation's Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) combines
the efforts of numerous Mine Action Centers (MACs) and local NGOs in
order to form one of the most comprehensive mine action programs in the
worl d. Operating under the direction of the United Nations Office for the
Coordi nation of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), MAPA has
successfully located and destroyed 1,629,6051andmines/ UXO and cleared
230,440,706 square meters of mined area and 339,579,010 square meters
of battlefield area.

by Susanna Sprinkel, MAIC

Introduction
Years of controversy have left Afghanistan as the country most severely
affected by landmines, with an estimated
150 to 300 landmine/UXO-related fatal ities each month. T hese artilleri es add an
unnecessary burden to the li ves of many
who already suffer on a daily basis from
numerous other hardships. As a result,
Afghanista n has developed one of the
strongest Mine Action Programs in the
world. The Mine Action Program fo r Afghan istan (MAPA) was developed in
1989 and has been working under supervision the of the United Nations O ffice
fo r the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance (UNOCHA) ever since.
T his program combines the efforts
of six Mine Acrion Centers (MACs)the UN M ine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) and five Regional Mine
Action Centers (RMACs) designated in
the central, southern, northern, eastern and
western regions of Afghanistan-as well
as 15 local NGOs in order to provide
extensive coverage of all areas of mine
action (for more information on partner
NGOs, see Table l below). UNOCHA,
United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) are responsible

fo r developing the structure of MAPA,
and they have designated specific respo nsibilities to each of the bodies involved.

Coordination of Mine
Action Activities

Designated Responsibilities
UNOCHA, UNDP and UNMAS
have requested that all mi ne action activities be planned and coordinated by
MACA and the Mine C learance and
Planning Agency (MCPA). Specifically,
these bodies are respo nsible for the fo llowing operations:
• Planning all mine action strategies
and operations.
• Developing a set of mine action
standards and policies.
• Overseei ng MAPA activities and
assuri ng quali ty.
• Implementing necessary programs
and supp ort for field operatio ns.
• Securing and distributing required
resources for all mine action programs.
• Organizing mine action technology.
• Managing and distributing minerelated information.

Goals for 2002
As outli ned in their 2002 Project
Plan (available at www.mineaction.org),
the Un ited Nations has establ ished the
fo llowing goals for coordination activities:
•
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•lmplementingaworkplanforall mine
action activities by contributing bodies.
• Developing a plan for further expanding MAPA, in order to meet increased demands that have arisen from
the current political situation in the counoy.
• Formulating a seven-year plan to
clear Afghanismn's lands ro a moderate level.
• Creating a n app roach for destroying stockpiles.
• Supplying periodic reports to donors on the funds received by MAPA.
• Forming an administrative contract
among contributing NGOs.
• Preparin g data on the mine threat
to be used both locally and globally.
• Providing necessary support to preserve and expand mine action activities
throughout the region.

•

An Afg han landmine
detection and
disposal worker from
HALO Trust clears
mines from the
shoulder of a road.
c/oAP

